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This paper analyzes the question of how differences in family size should be treated by the 
income tax system in order to achieve horizontal equity. Family size is incorporated into the 
demand system by the procedure of demographic scaling. Horizontal equity is defined as ‘equal 
treatment of equals’. It is shown that when lump-sum taxes are not available and the 
government has to rely on income taxation, then the only way to entail equal utilities for 
households of different size is to equate the labor supplies and the per-standard-adult 
consumptions of these households. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the question of how differences in family size 
should be treated by the income tax system in order to achieve horizontal 
equity. The answer to this question depends on (a) how differences in family 
size manifest themselves in the consumption patterns and labor supply (or, 
more generally, the preferences) of households of various sizes; and (b) how 
we define horizontal equity. 
One of the most common procedures of incorporating demographic 
variables in general and household size in particular into demand systems is 
that called ‘demographic scaling’ [see Pollak and Wales (1978,1980,1981) 
and references therein]. This method employs the idea of ‘equivalence scales’ 
or ‘standard adults’ in explaining the differences in demand patterns caused 
by household size differences. For our purposes we can describe the 
procedure of scaling as follows. Suppose for the sake of simplicity that there 
are only two family sizes: one-member and two-member families. It is 
assumed that a family of i members (i= 1,2) contains ci ‘standard adults’. 
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With no loss of generality, let c1 = 1 (so that a family of one person has one 
standard adult) and write c for c2. Suppose that each family has one wage- 
eurner and consumes an aggregate consumption good (x) and provides labor 
services (y). Scaling amounts to assuming that the two-member family’s 
preferences over bundles (x, y) are the same as the one-member family’s 
preferences over (x/c,y). The rationale for this assumption is that when a 
family of two members has a consumption of x, then its per-standard-adult 
consumption is only x/c. Thus, the utility that a two-member family with c 
standard adults derives from the bundle (x, y) is the same as the utility 
derived by a family with only one standard adult from the bundle (x/c, y).' 
Turning to the question of horizontal equity there is some ambiguity in 
the literature about the meaning of this concept. There are in fact two 
principles, most often referred to as the principle of horizontal equity. 
Feldstein (1976, p. 87) states that ‘the principle of horizontal equity in tax 
design implies that individuals who would be equally well off in the absence 
of the tax should be equally well off with the tax. The tax system should 
preserve the utility order of individuals.’ This definition of horizontal equity 
raises two problems. First, as Atkinson (1980, p. 16) puts it: ‘. it may be 
held to attach undue status to the pre-tax distribution’. There does not seem 
to be any compelling normative justification for emphasizing the preservation 
of the pre-tax ordinal ranking of individuals. Second, it should be quite 
obvious that horizontal equity, as defined above, does not follow from 
welfare maximization. Most social welfare functions, ‘based on end-result 
principles, such as utilitarian or Rawlsian theories, see the distribution of 
post-tax income as the sole matter for concern’ [Atkinson (1980, p. 18)]. 
Therefore a maximization of a social welfare function does not usually lead 
to horizontal equity. For instance, if the social welfare function is symmetric 
in individual utilities (e.g. the utilitarian social welfare function), then 
complete reversal of individual ranking has no welfare consequences: social 
welfare does not change if Jones, the poor, and Smith, the rich, trade 
positions. Namely, it does not matter whether the pre-tax rich is also the 
post-tax rich and the pre-tax poor is also the post-tax poor or the pre-tax 
rich becomes the post-tax poor and the pre-tax poor becomes the post-tax 
rich. 
‘Some may argue that, although scaling is a good way of explaining consumption patterns 
across families with different sizes, one should not use scaling for welfare comparisons- among 
such families [see. for instance. Pollak and Wales (1979)l. In other words, one should not 
attempt to say, as we did, that a two-person family derives the same utility from (x,y) as a one- 
person family derives from (x/c,y), for such a statement ignores the ‘utility from children’. 
Therefore it is concluded that no special attention should be paid by tax laws to family size. 
Although the argument that parents derive utility from their children is not without merit, we 
think that such an argument should be embodied in a model with endogenous fertility [e.g. 
Nerlove et al. (1984)]. In our context of exogenous fertility, we do not think that the size of the 
family should be ignored by tax laws. We do not think that children can be simply treated as a 
consumption by their parents. Children are, after all, human beings [see Nerlove et al. 
(forthcoming)]. 
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Another commonly held perception of horizontal equity is ‘equal treatment 
of equals’. The question naturally arises what we mean by the loose 
statement ‘equal treatment of equals’. According to Feldstein (1976, p. 83): ‘If 
two individuals would be equally well off.. . in the absence of taxation, they 
should also be equally well off if there is a tax.’ Note that this interpretation 
of the principle of horizontal equity is not identical to the principle of 
preservation of the pre-tax ordinal ranking of individuals [see Berliant and 
Strauss (1985)]. For instance, if all pre-tax poor become post-tax rich and all 
pre-tax rich become post-tax poor, we have rank reversals but no violation 
of the ‘equal treatment of equals’ principle, as defined above.2 
However, it seems to us more natural to adopt the view of Atkinson and 
Stiglitz’s perception of the notion of ‘equal treatment of equals’. They 
maintain that ‘the principle of horizontal equity states that those who are, in 
all relevant senses identical, should be treated identically’ (1980, p. 353). 
Indeed, this is the definition of horizontal equity that we adopt in this paper. 
We first note that this principle of horizontal equity does not follow from a 
maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function [see Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976,1980), Stiglitz (1982) and Balcer and Sadka (1979,1982)]. 
Atkinson (1980, p. 14) advocates the view that horizontal equity ‘is an 
independent principle that has to be balanced with maximization of welfare’. 
In this paper we superimpose the principle of horizontal equity on the 
utilitarian social welfare function, i.e. we maximize the latter function subject 
to the constraint that horizontal equity holds. 
Second, we have to clarify what we mean by ‘those who are in all relevant 
senses identical’ in our definition of horizontal equity. For our purposes, it 
will suffice to say that we believe that family size is not a relevant sense. 
Third, we have to explain also what we mean by ‘treated equally’. By this we 
do not mean to say that those who are equal should pay the same tax but 
rather that they should enjoy the same utility, Thus, we interpret the 
principle of horizontal equity to imply that families of different size should 
nevertheless attain the same level of utility. We believe that this notion of 
horizontal equity is what the designers of tax systems everywhere in the 
Western world have in mind, for otherwise how can we explain the tax relief 
that large families enjoy everywhere. This relief is usually aimed at equating 
the utility of the large family with that of the small family. 
Thus, our aim here is not simply to maximize the utilitarian social welfare 
function u(xr, y,) + u(xZ/c,y2), where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to one- 
member and two-member families, respectively, but rather to maximize it 
subject to the horizontal equity constraint that u(x,, y,) =u(x,/c, y2). It 
should be fairly obvious that the latter constraint is binding because the two 
*In fact, exactly this kind of rank reversal occurs under utilitarianism in some models of first- 
best taxation [see Sadka (1976b)]. 
82 K Balcer and E. Sadka, Equivalence scales 
families do not have the same marginal utility of consumption schedule: the 
marginal utility of the large family is only l/c of the marginal utility of the 
small family. Thus, a mere maximization of the utilitarian objective function 
will not usually lead to an equalization of utilities. 
Given our formulation of the difference in the utility functions of families 
of different sizes, the obvious way to ensure equal utilities for such families is 
to equate their labor supplies and per-standard-adult consumptions, namely: 
y, =y, and x1 =x,/c. 
However, this is certainly not the only way to guarantee horizontal equity. 
In fact, if the government can employ lump-sum taxes and transfers, then it 
never pays to equate the labor supplies and per-standard-adult consumptions 
of families of different size. As might be expected, the larger household 
should provide a lower supply of labor and have a lower level of consump- 
tion per standard adult. This is shown in section 2. 
However, one of the main results of this paper is that if lump-sum taxes 
and transfers are excluded and the government has to rely on income 
taxation, then equating the labor supplies and the per-standard-adult con- 
sumptions is the only way to entail equal utilities for households of different 
size (section 3). Thus, no matter what the social welfare function is, there is 
only one way to achieve horizontal equity: all families with the same earning 
ability must provide the same supply of labor and have the same per- 
standard-adult consumption, regardless of the size of the family. This rather 
strong result suggests that relying on income taxation in order to achieve 
horizontal equity causes some additional deadweight loss on top of the 
standard one which stems from the fact that an income tax creates a wedge 
between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and the 
marginal product of labor. Section 5 illustrates the magnitude of this 
additional loss. 
Optimal taxation theory says that when all families are of the same size, 
then the marginal tax rate should be non-negative everywhere and equal to 
zero at the bottom and top ends of the income distribution [see, for instance, 
Mirrlees (1971,1976)]. Section 4 discusses the properties of the optimal tax 
schedules facing the two types (by size) of households in our model economy. 
We show that an appropriately weighted average of these two schedules must 
have a marginal rate which is non-negative everywhere and equal to zero at 
both ends of the income distribution. But each individual schedule need not 
have this property. Furthermore, one of these two taxes will definitely have a 
marginal rate which is negative at sufficiently low and sufficiently high 
income levels; in fact, one of the two tax schedules may well have a marginal 
rate which is negative everywhere. 
As we have already mentioned, the principle of horizontal equity is 
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imposed throughout this paper on the utilitarian sum-of-utilities objective 
function for utilitarianism by itself cannot guarantee such equity. In appendix 
A we investigate the question whether a weighted sum of utilities, where 
higher weights are assigned to the larger families, can bring about horizontal 
equity. 
2. Horizontal equity with lump-sum taxes 
Let u and U be the utility functions of a one-member family and a two- 
member family, respectively. As explained in the introduction, it is assumed 
that these two utility functions are related to each other by 
wh Y) =4x/G Y). (1) 
Recall that horizontal equity is understood in this paper to mean that 
families with the same earning ability should enjoy the same level of utility, 
irrespective of their size. The earning ability or the skill of a household is 
identified with the wage rate of the single wage-earner in the household. 
Since lump-sum taxes and transfers are admissible in this section, it will 
suffice to consider only one wage level. Thus, we suppose that there is one 
one-member family and one two-member family, both facing the same wage 
rate, denoted by n. 
The objective is to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function 
(2) 
where xi and yi are the consumption and labor supply, respectively, of the 
family of i members, i= 1,2. On this objective function we impose the 
horizontal equity principle: 
4x1, Yl) = &lC,Y,). (3) 
The first-best optimum is then obtained by maximizing the utilitarian social 
welfare function (2), subject to the horizontal equity principle (3), and the 
resource constraint 
x,+xa+R5ny,+ny,, (4) 
where R is some predetermined level of public consumption. 
The Pareto-efficiency condition implied by our utilitarian objective requires 
us to equate each family’s marginal rate of substitution of consumption for 
leisure to its wage rate. Since our two households face the same wage rate, 
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then the marginal rates of substitution must be equated to each other: 
U,(% YA = c~y(%Ic> Y2) = _-n 
%(XbY,) %WC~ YJ . 
Since c > 1 (it is generally believed that 1 CC < 2), then condition (5) rules out 
the possibility of achieving horizontal equity [condition (3)] by equating 
labor supplies and per-standard-adult consumptions. In fact, assuming, as we 
do, that u is strictly concave, then (3) and (5) imply that the larger family 
should work and consume per standard adult less than the smaller family 
(see fig. 1). The economic explanation for this result is quite straightforward: 
since a dollar of consumption at the disposal of the larger family means only 
l/c dollars per standard adult, then the smaller household is more efficient in 
consuming x. Thus, the smaller family should consume more x per standard 
adult and, in order to maintain horizontal equity, should also work harder. 
=n 
Fig. 1 
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3. Horizontal equity with income taxation 
The preceding section showed that when lump-sum taxes are available, 
then equating the labor supplies and the per-standard-adult consumptions of 
households with the same earning abilities but different sizes is not an 
optimal way of achieving horizontal equity. However, we show in this section 
that such an equality becomes the only possible way of maintaining hori- 
zontal equity when lump-sum taxes and transfers are replaced by income 
taxes. 
In this section we assume that there is a continuum of households of each 
size. We denote by FJn) the number of i-member households who earn a 
wage rate which is less than or equal to n. It is assumed that the range of 
wages is the interval [0, co).3 We define fi(n)=F:(n), i= 1,2. Let x,(n) and 
y,(n) be the consumption and labor supply, respectively, of an i-member 
household whose wage is n. Then the utilitarian social welfare function 
becomes 
W= 7 uCxt(n),y,(n)lfi(n)dn 
0 
+ 4 uCxz(n)lc,Yz(n)lfi(n)dn. 
0 
(2’) 
We should emphasize here that the results of this section do not depend on a 
specification of a social welfare function. They hold whenever we impose the 
principle of horizontal equity in a model of income taxation. The horizontal 
equity condition becomes 
uC~~(n),~~(n)l =uC~~(xYc,~~(n)l for all n, (3’) 
and the resource constraint becomes 
+ J w(4MW. (4’1 
(All integrals are understood to be taken over the interval [0, co), unless 
otherwise stated.) 
3This assumption is much stronger than we. actually need. For instance, it will suffice to 
assume that the range of wages is an interval of the form [0, ri), where tic co. And even this is 
stronger than we need. Roughly speaking, all we need is that this interval will not be very small. 
To see this, recall that in the extreme case where this interval shrinks to just one point (section 
2), then horizontal equity does not necessarily mean equal per-standard-adult consumptions and 
labor supplies. 
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We assume that both consumption and leisure are normal goods and that 
u(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y. 
The objective is to maximize (2’) subject to (3’), (4’) and the constraint that 
only income taxation can be used. The latter constraint restricts our choice 
of allocations [x1(.), y,(.)] for one-member households and [x2( .), y,( .)] for 
two-member households. 
Specifically, these allocations have to be sustainable by income tax 
functions. Let Ai be the set of such allocations for i-member households, 
namely: 
A, = {[x( .), y( .)]/There exists an income tax function 
T such that for each IZ, [x(n), y(n)] maximizes 
u(x, y), subject to x 5 ny - T(ny)} (6) 
and 
A, = ([x( .), y( .)]/There exists an income tax function 
T such that for each n, [x(n), y(n)] maximizes 
u(x/c, y), subject to x 5 ny - T(ny)}. (7) 
Note that these sets are determined exclusively by the underlying utilities 
(namely, u for A, and U for A,) and not the distribution functions F, and 
F,. Note also that we are allowing the government to employ two different 
tax schedules for the two types of families. Then the restriction to employ 
only income taxation is complied with by adding the constraint 
[Xi( ‘), yi( ‘)] E Ai, i = 1,2. (8) 
The main result of this section is that when horizontal equity [condition 
(3’)] must be attained by income taxation [condition (S)], then one has to 
equate the per-standard-adult consumptions and the labor supplies of 
households with the same wages: 
xl(n) =MW and yl(n) =yh) (9) 
for all except, at most, countably many n’s. (The proof of this result is 
relegated to appendix B.) 
Furthermore, it is also shown in appendix B that if the tax functions Tl(.) 
and T,( .) support the allocations [x,(e), y,(.)] and [x,(s), yZ( *)I, respectively, 
then these two taxes are related to each other by 
T,(z) = T,(z)/c+z(c- 1)/c, (10) 
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where z ( = ny) is gross income. Hence, 







Since c> 1, it follows from (13) that 
T;(z) > T;(z). (14) 
The group of one-member families faces higher marginal tax rates than the 
group of two-member families. 
4. Optimal tax rates 
The optimal tax problem under consideration is that of maximizing the 
social welfare function (2’), subject to the horizontal equity principle (3’), the 
resource constraint (4’) and the income taxation constraint (8). However, in 









p(n) = Vi@) +cfi(Wf(n) (18) 
and 
f(n) =f1(n) +f+). (19) 
(Note that when the distribution of wages within each family size group is 
the same, i.e. when fi = ctfi for some constant c( >O, then p becomes a 
constant, independent of n.) 
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The above problem is a standard optimal tax problem analyzed in the 
public finance literature [see, for instance, Mirrlees (1976)-J, except for one 
minor difference: p in our problem depends on n. However, whether p is a 
constant or varies with n plays no role in establishing the qualitative 
properties of the optimal marginal tax rates [again, see Mirrlees 
(1971,1976)]. 
Thus, we can still claim that optimality requires that for each n the 
marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption, namely -uJu,, 
should be smaller than or equal to the social marginal rate of transformation 
of leisure into consumption, which is, by (16) equal to n/p. (This result is 
known as the non-negativity of the optimal marginal tax rate.) Let Tr be the 
income tax function which supports the optimal allocation [xl(.), yl(.)]. 
Since each household equates his marginal rate of substitution of leisure for 
consumption to his net wage rate which is n( 1 - T;), it follows that 
n(l-T;)sn/p 
or 
p(n) - 1 
T;CnY,(n)l>=-= 
f2(4(C - 1) 
p(n) fib) +42(n) 
We can then conclude from (12) that 




Multiply (20) by fr and (21) by f2 and then add them together to get: 
fib4 T’I Cnyl(n)l +f2(n) T’,Cv2(41 20. (22) 
This last result states that the weighted average of the two marginal tax 
rates, T; and T;, should be non-negative, where the weights are fi and f2, 
respectively. Since, by (14), we already know that ‘Pr >T ;, it follows that 
T; >O, as (20) indeed confirms. Thus, the marginal tax rate imposed on one- 
member families should be strictly positive. However, two-member house- 
holds may well face negative marginal tax rates. 
Similarly, a number of authors showed that the marginal tax rate in the 
standard optimal tax model should be zero at the bottom and top ends of 
the income distribution.4 This result too holds here only with respect to the 
weighted average of the two taxes, T; and T;. To see this, let the interval of 
wages be [N1,N2]. Then (20), (21) and (22) hold as equalities for n=N, and 
4The result for the bottom end holds only if the poorest person works. 
n=N,: 
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7’; = fdc - l)l(fi + CL) > 0 
and 
T;= -fi(c-l)/(fi+cf2)<o. 
Thus, at the end points N, and N,, the marginal tax rate imposed on one- 
member families is positive, the marginal tax rate imposed on two-member 
families is negative and their weighted average is zero.5 
5. The deadweight loss of horizontal equity with income taxation 
We have seen that when horizontal equity must be achieved via income 
taxation, then we must have equal per-standard-adult consumptions and 
equal labor supplies for households with equal wages. On the other hand, 
such equality is nonoptimal when lump-sum taxes can be used. This suggests 
that when horizontal equity is to be maintained, then income taxation has 
some extra deadweight loss over and above the usual deadweight loss which 
stems from the divergence between consumer and producer prices. In this 
section we attempt to illustrate the magnitude of this additional loss which 
we will call the horizontal equity deadweight loss of income taxation. 
We do this by comparing the cost of achieving horizontal equity via lump- 
sum taxes with the cost of achieving it via income taxation. Recall that the 
horizontal equity principle was imposed on, rather than implied by, the 
utilitarian social welfare objective. This suggests that horizontal equity 
imposes some cost on the utilitarian sum-of-utilities. By comparing this cost 
when lump-sum taxes are employed with the cost incurred when income 
taxation is used, we can get some idea about the magnitude of what we 
termed the horizontal equity deadweight loss of income taxation. 
Specifically, we first find the optimal lump-sum taxes and transfers without 
imposing the principle of horizontal equity. This is done by maximizing the 
social welfare function (2’) subject to the resource constraint (4’). Denote the 
optimal level of W by IF’. We next ask: What is the minimum amount of 
revenue that we have to lose if we try to maintain that same level of social 
welfare (namely, I7) while imposing horizontal equity? This loss is the cost of 
‘The result that the group of one-member families faces a positive marginal tax rate 
everywhere, including at N,, implies that society’s insistence on horizontal equity prevents it 
from making Pareto-improvement changes. By setting the marginal tax rate facing this group at 
zero beyond the income level of z2(N,), members of this group (namely, those with wages 
sufficiently close to NJ will be made better off and no one will be made worse off [see Sadka 
(1976a)]. Of course, the principle of horizontal equity will be then violated. 
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maintaining horizontal equity via lump-sum taxes. In a similar fashion we 
find the cost of maintaining horizontal equity via income taxation. The 
difference between the latter and the former costs illustrates the magnitude of 
the horizontal equity deadweight loss of income taxation. 
We consider a very simple poor-rich model: there are only two wage 
levels, Q (‘poor’) and nR (‘rich’), where np < nR. There are only two families at 
each wage level, one small and one large. The utility function u of a one- 
member family is specified as a CES: 
where o= l/(1 -p) is the (constant) elasticity of substitution and K is the 
endowment of leisure. E is a measure of inequality-aversion (increasing in a). 
The method that can be used to calculate optimal taxes in such discrete 
models is discussed at length in Balcer and Sadka (1979). Here we present 
only the results. The values for the parameters of the model are taken from 
Sadka, Garlinkel and Moreland (1982) who employ the 1976 Current 
Population Survey: 
R = $6184 per year; 
np = $3.56 per hour;‘j 
nR = $6.63 per hour;’ 
/I = 0.95; 
p = - 1.00 (i.e., 0=0.50); 
K = 3120 hours per year (60 hours per week, 52 weeks per year); 
c = 1.2.8 
Two values of E are considered: s=O.5 and E = 2.0. Table 1 presents 
optimal tax rates, labor supplies, pre-tax incomes, consumptions and utilities 
when horizontal equity is not imposed. Table 2 presents data for these 
variables when we pose the following question: If we try to achieve the same 
welfare levels (for the society) as in table 1, while imposing the principle of 
horizontal equity, how much revenue does the government have to give UP?~ 
Table 3 presents the costs of horizontal equity in absolute terms and as 
percentages of government revenues (R). It shows. that when lump-sum 
taxation is available, horizontal equity is achieved at a cost of $217 or 3.51 
percent of R (for &=0.5). When only income taxation is allowed does the 
6This is the average wage of the second lowest quint& of the population of the nonretired 
heads of households. 
‘This is the average wage of the second highest quantile of the population of nonretired heads 
of households. 
‘This figure is taken from Gaag and Smolensky (1980). 
‘Recall that we have here a discrete distribution of wages. This explains why the marginal 
income tax rate is zero at the top end of the income distribution, in contrast to the results of the 
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c = 0.5 217 3.51 221 3.57 
Cr=2.0 49 0.79 59 0.95 
cost rise to $221 or 3.57 percent of R. This suggests that the horizontal 
equity deadweight loss of income taxation is not significant: only $4 or 0.06 
percent of R. When &=2.0, the deadweight loss is still insignificant: $10 or 
0.16 percent of R. 
Appendix A 
Throughout this paper the principle of horizontal equity was imposed on 
the utilitarian sum-of-utilities social welfare function, for utilitarianism by 
itself does not guarantee such equity. In this appendix we discuss the 
question of whether a weighted sum of utilities, where higher weights are 
assigned to larger families, can enhance horizontal equity. 
For this purpose it suffices to consider only two households: a one- 
member household and a two-member household, both having the same 
earning ability which is denoted by n. We ask whether there exists a constant 
/1>0 such that the social welfare function, 
w=uhY,) +W,lc,y,), (A.11 
shows a preference towards horizontal equity in the sense that the optimal 
way to divide the national pie must preserve horizontal equity. Formally, we 
ask whether there exists a A>0 such that if (x,, y,) and (x,, y2) maximize 
(A.l) subject to the resource constraint 
P(XI +xd+RSnn(~, +Y,), 64.2) 
then they must satisfy the horizontal equity principle 
G%Yl)=~(4c~Y2). (A.3) 
For reasons which will be clear below we denote here the producer price of 
consumption by p rather than normalize it to a unity, as we did in the main 
text. 
Here it will be easier to work with the indirect utility function and with 
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leisure (I = K - y) rather than labor (y). Let V(p, n, I) and P(p, ~1, I), where 1 
denotes full-income, be the indirect utility function of a one-member house- 
hold and a two-member household respectively, i.e. 
V(p,n,I)=maxu(x,K-I) s.t.px+nlsI (A.4) 
and 
B(p,n,I)=maxu(x/c,K-1) s.t.(cp)(x/c)+nlsI. (A.3 
Then it is clear from (A.4) and (AS) that 
V(p, II, 1) = V(cp, ?I I). (A.6) 
With the aid of the indirect utility functions, the optimization problem of 
maximizing (A.l) subject to (A.2) reduces to the unconstrained maximization 
problem 
max [ V(p, n, I - T) + l.V(cp, n, I + T- R)], 
T 
(A.7) 
where T is a lump-sum tax imposed on the small family, and -(T-R) is the 
lump-sum tax imposed on the large family. The horizontal equity principle 
becomes now 
V(p, n, I - T) = V(cp, n, 1-t T- R). (A.@ 
The first-order condition for (A.7) which is both necessary and sufficient 
[note that since u is strictly concave in (x,1), then I/ is strictly concave in I] 
is 
V,(p, n, I - T) = %V,(cp, n, I + T-R). (A.9) 
Thus, we ask whether there exists a constant i. >O such that (A.9) implies 
(A.@. 
We can show that such a i. exists for a CobbbDouglas utility function. 
More generally, we can state sufficient conditions for such a i to exist. 
Suppose that u(x, K -1) is homothetic in (x, 1). In this case V’ takes the form 
(A.lO) 
Since V is homogeneous of degree zero in (p, n, I), it follows that h has to be 
homogeneous of degree - 1 in (p, n). G is strictly increasing and strictly 
concave. Suppose, furthermore, that h is of the form 
MP, n) = h(~)b(4 (A.1 1) 
I’. Balcer and E. Sadka, Equivalence scales 95 
Under these conditions, the required 1, exists. Define 
;I=h,(l)/h,(c). (A.12) 
Then in this case (A.9) reduces to 
G’CNP,4(1- T)lh(p,n)=G’lh(cp,n)(l+ T-R)lh(cp,n)h,(l)/h,(c). 
(A.13) 
Employing (A.1 1) and the homogeneity of degree - 1 of h, we see that 




Thus, (A.13) and (A.14) imply that 
G’CNp, 40 - T)l = G’[h(cp, n)(I + T-R)], 
and hence, by the strict concavity of G: 
h(p,n)(I-T)=h(cp,n)(l+T-R). 
In view of (A.lO), this last equality implies (A.8). 
The reader can verify that (A.lO) and (A.ll) hold for a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function. However, these two conditions, and especially (A.1 l), seem 
very strong to us. A CES utility function, for instance, does not satisfy (A.1 1). 
We could not find weaker conditions than (A. 10) and (A.1 1) and we 
conjecture that they are necessary as well as sufficient conditions. 
Appendix B 
In the appendix we prove that (3’) and (8) imply (9). This is done in four 
steps. 
(a) We first show that [x(.), y( .)] E A, if and only if [X(.), y(.)] E A,, where 
~?(n)“~~x(n)/c. Suppose (x( .), y( .)) E A,. Then there exists an income tax function 
T such that for each ~1, u[x(n)/c, y(n)] 2 u(x/c, y) whenever x sny- T(ny). 
Hence, u[Z(n), y(n)] 2 u(x/c, y) whenever x/c 5 [ny - T(ny)]/c. Put X=x/c and 
define another tax function T by 
z - T(z) = [z - T(z)]/c. 
[Note that (B.l) implies that 
T(z) = T(z)/c + z(c - 1)/c.] 
(B.1) 
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Then, u[.%(n), y(n)] 2 ~(55, y), whenever 14 ny- T(ny). Thus, T sustains the 
allocation [X(.), y( .)] and hence LX(.), y( .)] E A 1. The converse statement is 
proved in a similar way. 
(b) We will state here some properties of allocations which can be 
supported by income tax functions. Let v denote the household utility 
function and suppose that [x(.),y(.)] is sustainable by some income tax 
function, say 7: Then: 
(i) the pre-tax income function z(n)dgfny(n) is nondecreasing in n [see 
Mirrlees (1971)J. Thus, if [Xi(.), yi(.)] E& then z,(n) is nondecreasing in n; 
(ii) for all except, at most, countably many n’s, there is a unique solution 
to the household utility-maximization problem: max v(x, y), subject to x 5 ny - 
T(ny) [see Sadka (1976a)]; 
(iii) with no loss of generality we may assume that if ~20, then there exists 
n E [0, X) such that z(n) =z [see Sadka (1976a)]. 
(c) Next we show that if (i) [x( .), y(.)] and [X(.), y(.)] are two allocations 
which can be supported by income tax functions, say T and T respectively, 
and (ii) u[x(n),y(n)]=u[%(n),jj(n)] f or all n, then T= T and [x(n), y(n)] = 
[Z(n),y(n)] for all except, at most, countably many n’s. Suppose to the 
contrary that T# z i.e. there exists z0 >=O such that T(z,) > 7‘(z,). By (b)(iii) 
above, there exists n, E [0, cc) such that z(n,) = n,y(n,) = zo. Since 
T(z,) > T(z,,), it follows that u[Z(no), j(no)] > u[x( no), y(r~,)]~ which is a con- 
tradiction. Hence, T = T and it follows from (b)(ii) that x(n) =x(n) and y(n) 
= j(n) for all except, at most, countably many 11’s. 
(d) Now we prove that (3’) and (8) imply (9). Since (xZ(.),yz(.))~A2, then 
it follows from (a) above that [x2(.)/c,y2(.)] EAT. We also know that 
[xI(.),yl(.)]~AI and that u[x2(n)/c,yz(n)]=u[x,(n),y,(n)] for all n. There- 
fore, it follows from (c) that x,(n)/c=x,(n) and y2(n)=y,(n) for all except, at 
most, countably many n’s 
Furthermore, if we denote the taxes which support the allocations 
[x1(.), yr(.)] and [x2(.),yZ(.)] by Tl and T2, respectively, then (a) [especially 
eq. (B.l)] and (c) can determine the relationship between Tl and T,. Since 
[x2( .),yZ( .)] EAT, then [X2(.),y2( .)] EAT, where Z2(n)=x,(n)/c. Eq. (B.l) 
shows that the tax function T, defined by 
5$(z) = T2(z)/c + z(c - 1)/c (B.2) 
supports [X2( .), y2( .)I. By (c), T2 = Tl. This proves (10). 
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